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Abstract The paper investigates two-stage stochastic minimum spanning
tree games with perishable goods. The cooperative behaviour of the players
is dened. At each stage, all players jointly take action to construct a net-
work with a cost matrix. At the second stage, a particular player may leave
the game, and the probability of this leaving depends on the cooperative
behaviour of all players at the rst stage. At each stage game, the total cost
of the spanning tree is calculated to include the sum of the costs of the con-
tained edges and the cost of the loss of perishable goods expended on that
edge of the spanning tree. The characteristic functions in the game are con-
sidered, and the dynamic Shapley values are modied. The time consistency
of the dynamic Shapley values is studied.
Keywords: dynamic games, minimum cost spanning tree game, stochastic
games.
1. Introduction
This article studies two-stage stochastic minimum cost spanning tree games with
perishable goods. Perishable goods are those products whose quality or value de-
creases over time, such as vegetables, owers or seafood. Due to dierences in the
timing of transport and storage methods, perishable goods are more complex in
terms of cost loss and risk to players as they are transported through the logis-
tics network. In China, the loss of perishable food products has been calculated
to be between 20% and 30% of the production costs of the companies involved
(Wan and Cao, 2019). Research on the loss of perishable goods can be traced back
to the 1960s and has been systematically reviewed by Nahmias and Janssen et al. in
the eld of inventory control of perishable goods (Nahmias, 1982; Janssen, 2016).
The minimum cost spanning tree game is a classical model of cooperative games
derived from the minimum cost spanning tree problem and was formally proposed
by Claus and Kleitman (Claus, 1973) in 1973. The most famous solution to the
minimum spanning tree game is the Bird allocation proposed by Bird (Bird, 1976).
Dutta and Kar (Dutta, 2004) proposed the Dutta-Kar allocation, which satises
cost monotonicity and is in the core. The literature (Bird, 1976) also introduced
the concept of an irreducible core. Another important solution is called the Folk
allocation (Bergantinos and Vidal-Puga, 2007) which is the Shapley value of the
game corresponding to the irreducible graph.
In dynamic cooperative game theory, the time consistency of the solution is
a crucial concern. That is, players should be able to make an agreement at the
beginning of the game so that at the end of the game, they receive the gains specied
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in the solution, as previously agreed. In the case of time inconsistency, the players
in the game may break the initial agreement. In the literature (Li, 2016), the case
in which a minimum spanning tree game was combined with a stochastic game was
considered for the rst time. It considered the construction of dynamic Shapley
values in a two-stage minimum cost spanning tree game. At each stage, when the
players take dierent strategies, the costs of the edges constructed between the
players in the network may be dierent, and thus the associated minimum cost
spanning tree may be dierent, and the cost-sharing solutions obtained will be
dierent. It is assumed in the research that all players in the game adopt cooperative
behaviour in order to minimise the expected sum of their costs. The characteristic
function is dened. The dynamic Shapley value in the game is constructed, and the
problem of time consistency of the solution is considered. Further, in the literature
(Li, 2017), a two-stage stochastic minimum cost spanning tree game with perishable
goods is discussed.
In the goods transportation model, the value of a good varies following its utility
as the shipping time increases; see Fig. 1. Three cases are possible:
 The blue curve shows that the good's utility remains the same with an increase
in the shipping time (umbrellas, plastic toys for children, etc.).
 The green curve shows that the good's utility grows with an increase in the
shipping time (wine, antiques, etc.).
 The red curve shows that that the good's utility drops with an increase in the
shipping time. This applies to perishable goods, i.e., the ones becoming cheaper
over time (owers, fruits, etc.).
Fig. 1. Three types of goods with dierent utility dynamics.
The perishable goods can be divided into two groups:
1. The goods with a xed expiration date, without any value loss on a certain
period of time;
2. The continuously perishing goods, with a value decreasing proportionally to the
shipping time.
The second group of perishable goods is studied in this paper.
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This article follows the research (Li, 2017). At each stage of the game, the players
act together to construct a network, and a cost matrix of the network is obtained.
The network is built on a set of sources and vertices which represent the players. In
the research (Li, 2016), the minimum cost spanning tree is obtained after dening
this network with the cost matrix, using algorithms based on classical graph the-
ory (Dijkstra, 1959; Kruskal, 1956; Prim, 1957). In contrast, in the minimum cost
spanning tree games with perishable goods, the total cost of the spanning tree is
calculated to include the sum of the costs of the contained edges and the cost of
the loss of perishable goods expended on that edge of the spanning tree. It means
that the loss of perishable goods is generally less important for the same player on
two dierent spanning trees when the vertex of the player is closer to the source.
After the rst stage, a particular player leaves the game with a probability that
depends on the cooperative behaviour of all players in the rst stage. The total cost
to the players in this two-stage game is the sum of their costs in the rst and second
stages. All players select cooperative actions. We consider the strategy proles of
players with the minimum expected total cost of two-stage game as the cooperative
strategy. The characteristic functions in the game are considered, and the dynamic
Shapley values are modied. The time consistency of the dynamic Shapley values
is studied.
2. The Model
First of all, we describe the game model. When dening the two-stage game, we
begin with the one-stage game, which is a spanning tree game. Following (Li, 2016),
introduce the main denitions and necessary background from graph theory.
Assume that n players are in n dierent positions. To obtain perishable goods,
the players directly or indirectly connect to the source. After the rst stage, player
m ∈ N can leave the game with a probability p depending on the previous behavior
of players. If player m leaves the game, the set of players changes. Otherwise (player
m stays in the game), the game is repeated by analogy at the second stage. The
diagram of this game is presented in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. The diagram of the game.
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Denition 1. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a nite set of players, {0} be the source, and
N ′ = N ∪ {0}.
Denition 2. A graph dened on the set N ′ will be denoted by G(N ′, E), where
E = {(i, j) : (i, j) ∈ L ⊂ N ′}.
Denition 3. A pair (i, j) is called an edge in a graph G(N ′, E) if (i, j) ∈ E,
∀i, j ∈ N .
Denition 4. Two vertices i and j ∈ N ′ are said to be connected in a graph
G(N ′, E) if ∃(i1, i2), (i2, i3), . . . , (in−1, in) : (ik, ik+1) ∈ G(N ′, E), 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1,
i1 = i, and in = j.
Denition 5. A graph G(N ′, E) is said to be connected on the set N ′ if any two
vertices i, j ∈ N ′ are connected in G(N ′, E).
Denition 6. The set of all connected graphs on the set N ′ will be denoted by
GN ′ .
Denition 7. Associate with any i and j in a graph G(N ′, E) cost cij on the edge
(i, j), i ̸= j ∈ N ′, where cij = cji ∈ R+ and ∀i ∈ N ′ : cii = +∞. The cost ci0 = c0i
on the edge (i, 0), i ∈ N, is a nonnegative constant.
Depending on the interpretation of the model, the cost on an edge (i, j) can be
the consumption of some resource (e.g., fuel consumption when shipping a cargo
from vertex i to vertex j) or the value of some service (e.g., the price of connecting
vertex i to vertex j).
The cost on a graph G(N ′, E) can be represented as a cost matrix
C = {cij}(n+1)×(n+1). (1)
Note that a cost matrix is nonnegative and symmetric and has order (n+ 1)×
(n+ 1).
Example 1. Consider an example shown in Fig. 3. The red vertex 0 is the source,
and the four vertices indicated by green numbers are players. In this example, the
graph is complete, and each edge has a specic cost.
The corresponding cost matrix is given by
C = {cij}5×5 =

0 1 2 3 4
0 ∞ 6 3 15 11
1 6 +∞ 8 5 10
2 3 8 +∞ 4 12
3 15 5 4 +∞ 9
4 11 10 12 9 +∞
,∀i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}
2.1. Stage Game with Spanning Tree
Denition 8. (Li, 2016) At each stage, player i chooses a strategy vector(Li, 2016)
xi = (xi,1, . . . , xi,i−1, xi,i+1, . . . , xi,n),
where xi,j ∈ Xi,j denotes an action of player i against player j, ∀i, j ∈ N . Similarly,
xj,i ∈ Xj,i is an action of player j against player i.
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Fig. 3. Cost on complete graph with four players.
Denition 9. (Li, 2016) The cost on an edge (i, j) of a graph G(N ′, E) is dened
in the following way:
cij = cji = fc(xi,j , xj,i), ci0 = c0i > 0,∀i, j ∈ N. (2)
where a function fc maps the set of all strategies of players i, j into the set R+ ∪
{+∞} of all admissible costs on the edges (i, j) ∈ E.
In other words, the cost on an edge cij = cji is completely dened by the
strategies xi,j , xj,i of players i, j, where xi,j ∈ Xi,j , xj,i ∈ Xj,i,∀i, j ∈ N . The
cost on all edges between the players is dened by a given strategy prole x =
(x1, . . . , xn). Note that Cx = {cij}(n+1)×(n+1) is a unique cost matrix constructed
by Denition 9. Thus, for a cost matrix Cx = {cij}(n+1)×(n+1), there is a unique
graph G(N ′, E) ∈ GN ′ on the set N ′. Here GN ′ denotes the set of all possible
connected graphs on the set N ′.
Fig. 4. Graphs with dierent costs on edges corresponding to dierent strategies of players.
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Example 2. Consider a three-player game. Let the function fc be fc = xi,j × xj,i,

















3,2) = (1, 2),
respectively, we easily calculate the cost on all edges between the players. In the left-





For example, for the edge (1, 2), we have c12 = c21 = x
′
1,2 × x′2,1 = 3× 4 = 12.

















3,2) = (1, 3),
the costs on all edges between the players varies. In the right-hand part of Fig. 4,




3). For example, for the
edge (2, 3), we have c23 = c32 = x
′′
2,3 × x′′3,2 = 2× 3 = 6.
Denition 10. (Li, 2016) A minimum cost spanning tree on the set N ′ is the tree





where Cx = {cij}(n+1)×(n+1) denotes a cost matrix on a graph G(N ′, E), which is
uniquely dened by the strategy prole x = (x1, . . . , xn). Here GN ′ denotes the set
of all possible connected graphs on the set N ′.
Denition 11. (Li, 2016) The total cost on the edges of a minimum cost spanning
tree T (N ′, Cx) is given by




Obviously, a graph with a minimum cost represents a tree. Otherwise, we would
eliminate an extra edge to get a connected graph with a smaller cost.
Example 3. As an illustrative example, consider a one-stage three-player game. Let
N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of players, {0} be the source, and N ′ = N ∪ {0}. The
corresponding graph on the setN ′ is shown in Fig. 5. Assume that edges (0, 1), (0, 2),
and (0, 3) are xed, and the cost on these edges is c01 = c10 = 30, c02 = c20 = 51,
and c03 = c30 = 16, respectively. The function cij = fc(xi,j , xj,i) has the form
fc(xi,j , xj,i) = xi,j × xj,i, ∀i, j ∈ N .
All possible costs on the edges (i, j),∀i ̸= j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are combined in Table 1.
Here the red, green, and blue colors indicate dierent edges. Let X2,3 = {2, 21} be
the set of actions of player 2 against player 3, and X3,2 = {12, 19} be the set of
actions of player 3 against player 2, where x2,3 ∈ X2,3 and x3,2 ∈ X3,2. If player 1
chooses the action x2,3 = 21, and player 2 chooses the action x3,2 = 12, then the
cost makes up c23 = fc(x2,3, x3,2) = 21× 12 = 252.
Dierent strategies result in dierent cost matrices, and a minimum spanning
tree can be obtained for each cost matrix. Assume that the players choose their
strategies, and the strategy prole in the game is
x1 = (x1,2, x1,3) = (6, 3), x2 = (x2,1, x2,3) = (7, 2), x3 = (x3,1, x3,2) = (9, 12).
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Fig. 5. Minimum cost spanning tree for graph constructed by players.
The graph with cost corresponding to the strategy prole (9, 12) is shown in
Fig. 5.
The cost matrix takes the form
Cx =

0 1 2 3
0 ∞ 30 51 16
1 30 +∞ 42 27
2 51 42 +∞ 24
3 16 27 24 +∞

After obtaining the cost matrix, the minimum cost spanning tree T (N ′, Cx)
on the graph consists of edges (0, 3), (1, 3), and (2, 3); see dotted lines in Fig. 5.
Therefore, the total cost in the minimum cost spanning tree T (N ′, Cx) under the
strategy prole x = (x1, x2, x3) is
C[T (N ′, Cx)] = 67,
where x1 = (x1,2, x1,3) = (6, 3), x2 = (x2,1, x2,3) = (7, 2), x3 = (x3,1, x3,2) = (9, 12).
Denition 12. A route in a tree T (N ′, Cx) is a sequence of vertices i1, i2, . . . , iK
and edges (ik, ik+1) for all k ∈ [1,K−1] and K ∈ N+, K ≥ 2. We say that this route
passes the edges (ik, ik+1) and the vertices i1, i2, . . . , iK . If a route i1, i2, . . . , iK in
a tree T (N ′, Cx) passes none of the edges (ik, ik+1) twice, it is called a path. In this
case, vertex i1 is called the start vertex of the path, and vertex iK the end vertex
of the path. In a tree T (N ′, Cx), we denote by Pi1iK a path from vertex i1 to vertex
iK , and by Pm0 a path from any vertex m ∈ N to the source {0}.
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Denition 13. Vertex j is called a predecessor of vertex m if Pj0 ⫋ Pm0, where
Pj0 is a path from source {0} to vertex j in a tree T (N ′, Cx), j ∈ N .
Denition 14. Consider a tree T (N ′, Cx). Assume that for any vertex m ∈ N,
a path Pm0 from the start vertex m to the end vertex {0} passes vertices m1,
m2, . . . ,mK and edges (mk,mk+1), where k ∈ [1,K − 1], m1 = m, mK = {0},
K ∈ N+, and K ≥ 2. Then vertex mk is called a direct predecessor of vertex mk+1.
A direct predecessor of vertex m will be denoted by P (m). If the path includes only
two vertices m and m′, then P (m) = m′.
Denition 15. For any subtree T (S,CSx ) of a tree T (N
′, Cx), S ⫋ N , consider
vertex i ∈ S. If after deleting this vertex i in the subtree T (S,CSx ), for all j ∈ S \{i}
the path Pj0 does not exist, then the set of all edges of the subtree T (S,C
S
x ) is called
a branch in the tree T (N ′, Cx). This set will be denoted by B
i.
Denition 16. Vertex i ∈ N is said to be terminal in a tree T (N ′, Cx) if there
does not exist a vertex j ∈ N \ {i} such that P0i ⊂ P0j and P0j ∈ T (N ′, Cx).
Example 4. Consider an example in Fig. 6. Here {0} is the source in a spanning
tree T (N ′, Cx). The following can be established directly by denition.
 All blue edges (0, j1), (j1, j2), (j2, j3) make a path Pm0 from source {0} to vertex
m.
 Each of the vertices j1, j2, j3 is a predecessor of vertex m. Moreover, vertex j3
is a direct predecessor of vertex m, i.e., P (m) = j3.
 Let S be the set of all red vertices, and m ∈ S. Then Bm is the set of all edges
in the yellow domain.
Fig. 6. Path Pm0, direct predecessor of vertex m, predecessor of vertex m, and branch
Bm.
Denition 17. (Li, 2016) The probability that player m will leave the game at the




C[T (N ′, Cx)]
,
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where the minimum cost spanning tree T (N ′, Cx) is given by Denition 10 on the
graph G(N ′, E) constructed under the strategy prole x = (x1, . . . , xn). Due to 15,
Bm is a branch in T (N ′, Cx).
2.2. Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Game with Perishable Goods
Denition 18. The loss in value for the perishable goods of player i is given by
LV = qi(1− e
θi∑
ckl ),∀i ∈ N, (k, l) ∈ Pi0, (3)
qi ∈ (0,+∞), θi ∈ (0,+∞)
where Pi0 denotes the path from source {0} to vertex i, and qi is the cost of per-
ishable goods of player i. In addition, θi is the loss parameter of player i due to
perishable goods, ∀i ∈ N .
According to formula (3), the longer the path Pi0 from vertex i to source {0} is,
the greater the level of LV for player i will be.
Dierent from Denition 10, the denition of a minimum spanning tree with
perishable goods is given below.
Denition 19. (Li, 2017) A minimum cost spanning tree with perishable goods on
the set N ′ is the tree












where Cx = {cij}(n+1)×(n+1) denotes a cost matrix on a graph G(N ′, E), and the
cost matrix Cx itself is determined using a strategy prole x = (x1, . . . , xn).
Denition 20. (Li, 2017) The total cost on the edges of a minimum cost spanning
tree with perishable goods T θ(N ′, Cx) is given by









where x = (x1, . . . , xn) denotes the strategy prole of all players.
If player m leaves the game, the set of players will be N \ {m}, and N ′ \ {m} =
N \ {m} ∪ {0}.
Denition 21. (Li, 2017) A minimum cost spanning tree with perishable goods on
the set N ′ \ {m} is the tree













where x \ {m} = (x1, . . . , xm−1, xm+1, . . . , xn) denotes the strategy prole of all
players, except the player m.
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Denition 22. (Li, 2017) The total cost on the edges of a minimum cost spanning
tree with perishable goods T θ(N ′ \ {m}, Cx\{m}) is given by











where x \ {m} = (x1, . . . , xm−1, xm+1, . . . , xn) denotes the strategy prole of all
players, except the player m.
The value p (the probability that player m will leave the game) is given by
Denition 17.
3. Description of the Game
Stage 1: At the rst stage, the spanning tree game with perishable goods repre-
sents a simultaneous n-player game; see Fig. 2. Therefore, at the rst stage in vertex
z1, the players simultaneously choose their strategies in the form of n-dimensional
proles









i,i+1, . . . , x
1
i,n),
∀i ̸= j ∈ N,
where x1i,j ∈ X1i,j denotes an action of player i against player j.
Stage 2: If player m still participates in the game after the rst stage in vertex
z1, the spanning tree game with perishable goods evolves to the second stage in
vertex z2; see Fig. 2. All players again simultaneously choose their strategies in the
form of the n-dimensional proles









i,i+1, . . . , x
2
i,n),
∀i ̸= j ∈ N,
(7)
where x2i,j ∈ X2i,j denotes an action of player i against player j.
Then the cost matrix Cx2 = {cij}(n+1)×(n+1), ∀i ̸= j ∈ N is formed on the
graph G(N ′, E) by the strategy proles (7); see Denition 9.
If playerm leaves the game, the set of players will be N \{m}. Then the spanning
tree game with perishable goods evolves to the second stage in vertex z3; see Fig. 2.
All players, except for player m, simultaneously choose their strategies in the form
of the (n− 1)-dimensional proles
x2 \ {m} = (x21, . . . , x2m−1, x2m+1, . . . , x2n),
x2i = (x
2




i,i+1, . . . , x
2
i,n),
∀i ̸= j ∈ N \ {m},
where x2i,j ∈ X2i,j denotes an action of player i against player j.
Then the cost matrix Cx2\{m} = {cij}n×n,∀i ̸= j ∈ N \ {m} is formed on the
graph G(N ′ \ {m}, E) by the strategy proles (3.); see Denition 9.
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4. Cooperative Game
Assume that in the two-stage game, the cost on the edges between the players
is equal to the sum of corresponding costs at the rst and second stages. Consider
a cooperative version of the game in which all players jointly choose their strategies
to minimize the expected total cost on edges.
Dene a characteristic function for the coalition N. Suppose that some path
z1, z2 is realized during the game with perishable goods.
Thus, xi(z1) = x
1
i and xi(z2) = x
2
i , i ∈ N.





C[T θ(N ′, Cx1)] +
[
pC[T θ(N ′ \ {m}, Cx2\{m})] + (1− p)C[T θ(N ′, Cx2)]
]}
= C[T θ(N ′, Cx̄1)] +
[







. The strategies x̄i(·), i ∈ N, are said to be cooperative, and
x̄(·) = (x̄1, . . . , x̄n) is called a cooperative strategy prole. In addition, C[T θ(N ′, Cx)]
and C[T θ(N ′ \ {m}, Cx\{m})] denote the total cost on the edges in the perishable
goods trees T θ(N ′, Cx) and T
θ(N ′ \ {m}, Cx\{m}), respectively (see Denition 22).
Denition 24. Dene the characteristic function for the coalition S ⫋ N,S′ =
S ∪ {0}, in the following way.
If m ∈ S, S′ = S ∪ {0}, and xS(·) = {xi(·), i ∈ S}, then









pC[T θ(S′ \ {m}, CS
′\{m}
x2S\{m}









pC[T θ(S′ \ {m}, CS
′\{m}
x̄2S\{m}






If m /∈ S, S′ = S ∪ {0}, and xS(·) = {xi(·), i ∈ S}, then











= C[T θ(S′, CS
′
x̄1S















′\{m} denotes the cost matrix restricted
to S′ or S′ \ {m}. xS(·) are strategy proles of coalition S.
In addition, C[T θ(S′, CS
′
xS )] and C[T
θ(S′ \ {m}, CS
′\{m}
xS\{m})] denote the total cost
on the edges in the perishable goods trees T θ(S′, CS
′
xS ) and T
θ(S′ \ {m}, CS
′\{m}
xS\{m}),
respectively (see Denition 22).
If S = ∅, then
V 1(∅ ∪ {0}) = 0.
The characteristic function for the coalition N at the second stage is dened in
a similar way.
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Denition 25. If player m leaves the game after the rst stage, then
V 2(N ′ \ {m}) = min
x2(·)
C[T θ(N ′ \ {m}, Cx2\{m})] = C[T θ(N ′ \ {m}, Cx̄2\{m})],
where the strategies x̄2i (·), i ∈ N \ {m}, are said to be cooperative, and x̄2(·) =




m+1, . . . , x̄
2
n) is called a cooperative strategy prole. In addition,
C[T θ(N ′ \ {m}, Cx2\{m})] denotes the total cost on the edges in the perishable
goods tree T θ(N ′ \ {m}, Cx2\{m}) (see Denition 22).
If player m does not leave the game after the rst stage, then
V 2(N ′) = min
x2S(·)
C[T θ(N ′, Cx2S )] = C[T
θ(N ′, Cx̄2S )], (8)
where the strategies x̄2i (·), i ∈ N, are said to be cooperative, and x̄2(·) = (x̄21, . . . , x̄2n)
is called a cooperative strategy prole. In addition, C[T θ(N ′, Cx2)] denotes the total
cost on the edges in the perishable goods tree T θ(N ′, Cx2) (see Denition 22).
The characteristic function for the coalition S ⫋ N,S′ = S ∪ {0}, at the second
stage is dened in a similar way:








where S ⫋ N,S′ = S ∪ {0}, and CS′ denotes the cost matrix restricted to S′. xS(·)
are strategy proles of coalition S.
In addition, C[T θ(S′, CS
′
x2S
)] denotes the total cost on the edges in the perishable
goods tree T θ(S′, CS
′
x2S
) (see Denition 22).
If S = ∅, then
V 2(∅ ∪ {0}) = 0.
5. Dynamic Shapley value
Dene the dynamic Shapley value, in the game itself and in each subgame.







[V 1(S′π(i) ∪ {i})− V
1(S′π(i))],
where ∀i ∈ N,S′ = S ∪ {0}, S ⊆ N \ {i}, N ′ = N ∪ {0}, Π denotes the set of all
permutations on N, and Sπ(k) = {i|π(i) < π(k)}.
Denition 27. If player m leaves the game after the rst stage, then
Sh2i (N




[V 2(S′π′(i) ∪ {i})− V
2(S′π′(i))],
where ∀i ∈ N \ {m}, S′ = S ∪ {0}, S ⊆ N \ {m, i}, N ′ = N ∪ {0}, Π ′ denotes the
set of all permutations on N \ {m}, and Sπ′(k) = {i|π′(i) < π′(k)}.







[V 2(S′π(i) ∪ {i})− V
2(S′π(i))],
where ∀i ∈ N,S′ = S ∪ {0}, S ⊆ N \ {i}, N ′ = N ∪ {0}, Π denotes the set of all
permutations on N, and Sπ(k) = {i|π(i) < π(k)}.
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Denition 28. The Imputation Distribution Procedure for the Shapley value in
the two-stage perishable goods game is a payment scheme β = (β1, β2) given by
β1 = Sh1(N ′)− pSh2(N ′ \ {m})− (1− p)Sh2(N ′),




C[T θ(N ′,Cx̄1 )]
is the probability that player m will leave the game at the
second stage.
The dynamic Shapley values based on the Imputation Distribution Procedure
(IDP) is constructed (Petrosyan, 1979).
Denition 29. The Shapley value Sh1 is said to be time-consistent in the perish-
able goods game if there exists a nonnegative IDP (β1i ≥ 0, β2i ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N) such
that
Sh1(N ′) = β1 + pSh2(N ′ \ {m}) + (1− p)Sh2(N ′),




C[T θ(N ′,Cx̄1 )]
is the probability that player m will leave the game at the
second stage.
Unfortunately, the IDP β may have a negative values in the two-stage perishable
goods game.
Proposition 1. The IDP β for the dynamic Shapley value Sh1 = (Sh11, . . . , Sh
1
n)
constructed by Denition 28 is time-inconsistent.
For proving this result, we provide an example when the IDP for the dynamic
Shapley value is time-inconsistent.
Example 5. Consider a two-stage perishable goods game of two players as follows.
N = {1, 2}, {0} is the source, and N ′ = N ∪ {0}. Assume that player 2 may leave
the game after the rst stage.
This game is shown in Fig. 7.
The cost on the edges (0, 1), (0, 2), the cost of perishable goods and the loss
parameters are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. The cost on the edges (0, 1), (0, 2) and other parameters for perishable goods
c01 c10 c02 c20
Player 1 Player 2
q1 θ1 q2 θ2
80 80 10 10 4 10 2 15
Suppose that the sets of actions of player 1(2) against player 2(1) are
X1,2 = {2, 4}, X2,1 = {3, 5}.
The function fc has the form fc = x1,2x2,1, where x1,2 ∈ X1,2 and x2,1 ∈ X2,1.
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Fig. 7. Two-stage perishable goods game of two players.
For this two-stage game, we obtain the following cooperative strategy of the




1) = (2, 2). And cooperative strategy of the player 2: x̄2 =
(x̄12, x̄
2
2) = (3, 3).
In two-stage games and the subgame, the characteristic functions S ⫋ N and
the Shapley values of the players are shown in Table 3.
Table 3. The characteristic functions S ⫋ N and the Shapley values of players(p = 0.375).
Stage 1
V 1(N ′) V 1({1} ∪ {0}) V 1({2} ∪ {0}) Sh11(N ′) Sh12(N ′)
61.7219 160.94 23.1074 99.7772 -38.0553
Stage 2(if player 2 leaves the game).
V 2(N ′) V 2({1} ∪ {0}) V 2({2} ∪ {0}) Sh21(N ′) Sh22(N ′)
80.47 80.47 0 80.47 0
Stage 2(if player 2 stays in the game).
V 2(N ′) V 2({1} ∪ {0}) V 2({2} ∪ {0}) Sh21(N ′) Sh22(N ′)
19.4127 80.47 11.5537 44.1645 -24.7518
As a result, we obtain the IDP
β11 ≈ 32.92, β12 ≈ −28.77, β21 ≈ 66.86, β22 ≈ −9.28.
Obviously, the dynamic Shapley value in this example is time-inconsistent.
Theorem 1. In the two-stage game, there exists some player m that may leave the
game at the second stage with a probability depending on the choice of all players
at the rst stage. The dynamic Shapley value constructed by Denition 26 is time-
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consistent if, for each stage,
p = 0,∑
S⊆N\{i}















C[T θ(N ′,Cx̄1 )]
is the probability that player m will leave the game at the
second stage, and x̄S(·) are strategy proles of coalition S.












2(S′π(i))],∀i ∈ N,S ⊆ N \{i}, S
′ = S∪{0}.
Since p = 0, player m stays in the game at the second stage. For (9) we apply








C[T θ(S′π(i) ∪ {i}, C
S′π(i)∪{i}
x̄2S








|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
[
C[T θ(S′ ∪ {i}, CS
′∪{i}
x̄2S






















,∀i ∈ N,S′ = S ∪ {0}.
From conditions (10) we obtain∑
S⊆N\{i}


















[V 2(S′π(i) ∪ {i})− V
2(S′π(i))] ≥ 0,
where ∀i ∈ N,S ⊆ N \ {i}, S′ = S ∪ {0}, Π denotes the set of all permutations on
N , Sπ(k) = {i|π(i) < π(k)}, and x̄S(·) = (x̄i, i ∈ S) are strategy proles of coalition
S.




′)− pSh2i (N ′ \ {m})− (1− p)Sh2i (N ′)
= Sh1i (N
′)−0pSh2i (N ′ \ {m})− (1− 0)Sh2i (N ′) = Sh1i (N ′)− Sh2i (N ′).
(11)
Using the equivalent formula for the Shapley value together with Denitions 26
and 27, we nd:
Sh1i (N
′)− Sh2i (N ′)

















|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!




|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!




|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
[V 1(S′ ∪ {i})− V 1(S′)− V 2(S′ ∪ {i}) + V 2(S′)], (12)
where i ∈ N,S′ = S ∪ {0}, S ⊆ N \ {i}, N ′ = N ∪ {0}, Π denotes the set of all
permutations on N, and Sπ(k) = {i|π(i) < π(k)}.
We utilize the characteristic function dened as described before. For S ⫋ N, if
m ∈ S, S′ = S ∪ {0}, then





pC[T θ(S′ \ {m}, CS
′\{m}
x̄2S\{m}










0C[T θ(S′ \ {m}, CS
′\{m}
x̄2S\{m}





= C[T θ(S′, CS
′
x̄1S




If m /∈ S, S′ = S ∪ {0}, xS(·) = {xi(·), i ∈ S}, then









= C[T θ(S′, CS
′
x̄1S




Since p = 0, player m stays in the game at the second stage. Therefore, formu-
las (8), (9), (12),(13) and (14) imply
V 1(S′)− V 2(S′) = C[T θ(S′, CS
′
x̄1S
)] + C[T θ(S′, CS
′
x̄2S




= C[T θ(S′, CS
′
x̄1S
)], S ⫋ N,
(15)
where x̄S(·) = (x̄i, i ∈ S) are strategy proles of coalition S.
Thus, from (12) and (15) we obtain
Sh1i (N




|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
[(









|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
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From (10), (11) and (16) we obtain:∑
S⊆N\{i}













′)− Sh2i (N ′) ≥ 0,
where ∀i ∈ N,S ⊆ N \ {i}, S′ = S ∪ {0}, Π denotes the set of all permutations on
N , Sπ(k) = {i|π(i) < π(k)}, and x̄S(·) = (x̄i, i ∈ S) are strategy proles of coalition
S.
The proof of Theorem 1 is complete.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we study two-stage minimum spanning tree games with perishable
goods. A particular player leaves the game at the end of the rst stage with a certain
probability. This probability depends on the behaviour of all players in the rst
stage. A dynamic Shapley value is constructed by dening characteristic functions
of the cooperative game. Moreover, a theorem is presented in which the dynamic
Shapley value is time consistent if specic conditions are satised.
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